The nature of the business cycle appears to have changed. Prior to the 1990s, recoveries from recessions were quick and steep; after the past three recessions, however, recoveries were weak and prolonged. We consider the e¤ect of a number of countercyclical policies intended to shorten recessions and speed recoveries. Our innovation is to analyze the duration of the recoveries of various U.S. states, which gives us a cross-section of both state-and nationallevel policies. Because we study multiple recessions for the same state and multiple states for the same recession, we can control for di¤erences in the economic conditions preceding the recessions and the causes of the recessions when evaluating various policies. We …nd that expansionary monetary policy at the national level helps to stimulate the exit of individual states from recession. We also …nd certain factors extend expected recovery times: other states in the same region su¤ering from recession around the same time, the length of the preceding recession, and shocks to oil prices at the peak.
Introduction
The U.S. business cycle is often characterized as an aggregate phenomenon that moves the economy between recessionary and expansionary phases [e.g., Burns and Mitchell (1946) ; Hamilton (1989) ; and many others]. Because most empirical papers assume a binary process for the business cycle, few consider how the economy recovers from recession. Models that include only expansion and recession regimes have so-called L-shaped recoveries that never return to the original trend growth rate and are, thus, ill-equipped for studying jobless recoveries. 1 The recent jobless recoveries have called into question the e¢ cacy of a variety of countercyclical policies, especially those for stimulating recovery in labor markets.
The cause of jobless recoveries have been studied in previous papers. Gordon (1993) suggests an explanation rooted in structural change. Aaronson Because there are relatively few jobless recoveries, some have opted to study disaggregate data to explain aggregate labor market conditions. For example, Jaimovich and Siu (2012) examine the e¤ect of recent recoveries on di¤erent occupations and demonstrate that jobless recoveries are intrinsically linked to another phenomenon: job polarization, in which middle-skilled routine jobs disappear during recessions. More recently, Panovska (2012) and Bachmann (2011) consider explanations linking the Great Recession and earlier jobless recoveries by discussing potential costs of adjusting the workforce at both the extensive and intensive margins. 1 Notable exceptions are Kim, Morley, and Piger (2005, KMP) , who model a post-recession, deterministic, higherthan-average growth rate bounce-back regime, and Dueker (2006) , who models the economy as a four-regime Markov process. Dueker interprets two regimes as the typical expansion and recession; the two extra regimes include a high growth recovery regime and a slow growth regime. In Dueker's model, the transition between regimes is probabilistic (with certain restrictions), meaning that the economy may or may not enter the high growth recovery phase. In these types of models, the duration of the recovery period is either deterministic (KMP) or probabilistic (Dueker) but never an explicit function of policy or regulation.
We approach the problem from the perspective of policymaking: Are there policies-either national or state-level-that a¤ect the duration of economic recoveries? We consider four policies that have traditionally been viewed as useful for combating recessions: (1) expansionary monetary policy, (2) expansionary …scal policy (increased government spending and decreased taxes), (3) increased unemployment bene…ts, and (4) the use of state "rainy day" funds.
Because of the relative dearth of national-level recessions, we exploit the heterogeneity in the states' recession experiences over time and across space. According to Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005) and Hamilton and Owyang (2012) , some states and regions within the U.S. may deviate from the pattern of the national business cycle. Carlino and Sill (2001) also …nd large di¤erences in business cycle volatility across regions. They …nd that each region has a di¤erent mixture of industries, experiences di¤erent shocks to its output, and thus experiences region-speci…c business cycles. Because of the heterogeneity across states, enacting expansionary policy during a national recession may stimulate some regional labor markets more than others.
These papers also argue that the similarity in states' business cycles can be associated with similarities in certain state-level characteristics-e.g., the fraction of employment in the manufacturing sector or the percentage of state personal income obtained from the energy sector. Others have surmised that the dispersion in unemployment rates across Europe is caused by centralized collective bargaining and government policies that hinder regional labor market adjustments. 2 In order to identify the e¤ect of policy, we need to control for variation in the economic conditions and demographics across states that may magnify any heterogeneous e¤ects. For example, Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005) and Hamilton and Owyang (2012) argue that the similarity in states'business cycles can be associated with similarities in certain state-level characteristics-e.g., the fraction of employment in the manufacturing sector or the percentage of state personal income obtained from the energy sector. Potential characteristics a¤ecting recovery duration could be inherent to the state (e.g., manufacturing share of employment) or be speci…c to the particular recession experience (e.g., the depth of the recession, the number of other states a¤ected by the recession).
We also take a di¤erent approach than the extant literature that uses Markov-switching models by explicitly considering the duration of the recovery period as a function of time-speci…c, state-speci…c, and state-time-speci…c covariates. We consider individually all state-level recession experiences, regardless of whether they appear idiosyncratic or associated with a national recession.
Thus, our identi…cation of the e¤ects of policy comes through the variation in the magnitudes and timing of the state-level recessions. We model the e¤ect of the covariates on the duration of the recovery as an accelerated failure time model, where the treatment identi…ed by the possibly timevarying covariates increases or decreases the length of the recovery multiplicatively. Because the number of covariates can be large, we utilize a Bayesian algorithm that reduces the dimension of the covariate vector by excluding variables that have no e¤ect on the duration of recoveries. Ultimately, we …nd that expansionary monetary policy at the national level helps to stimulate individual states out of recession. Our results also suggest that expected recovery times are longer if other states in the same region are su¤ering from recession around the same time, if the preceding recession is longer, or if we see signi…cant shocks to oil prices at the peak.
The balance of the paper is laid out as follows: Section 2 reviews the data. Section 3 outlines the empirical model and Section 4 describes the methods used for estimation. Section 5 presents the results of the estimation. Section 6 o¤ers some conclusions.
Data
The model is estimated using the duration of recoveries, policy variables, and state-level characteristics that could lead to heterogeneous responses to expansionary policy. This section describes the construction of the data. Because we do not assume that state-level recessions follow the same pattern as suggested by the national-level recession indicators, we must …rst de…ne recessions and then de…ne recoveries. We then discuss the state-and national-level characteristics that might a¤ect the duration of recoveries. Finally, we outline the data used to measure policy itself.
De…ning Recessions and Recoveries
Our business cycle indicator is the seasonally adjusted monthly level of payroll employment for the 48 contiguous states. Employment is useful as a business cycle indicator, especially because we are interested in jobless recoveries and because we need a variable that can be observed in levels in order to determine the length of a recovery. Thus, the state-level unemployment rate cannot be used as our business cycle indicator. Alternatively, state-level GDP is observed only annually and thus would not be an adequate measure of the duration of recoveries. The employment data are available beginning in 1939 for all states except Illinois (1947), Michigan (1956) , and Minnesota (1950). Because we treat each state-recession experience on a case-by-case basis, we do not need a balanced panel.
Using the employment data, we de…ne recessions and recovery periods independently for each state instead of taking the NBER recession dates as given. This approach allows us to take advantage of the fact that states may vary in the timing and frequency of their recessions as in Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005) . 3 Because the state-level employment data can be noisy, we consider a state in recession when its level of employment falls for at least six of eight consecutive months-i.e., more than two quarters. While the six month cuto¤ could be considered ad hoc, it eliminates temporary ‡uctuations not associated with recessions and allows a state's recession experience to have a few months of positive employment growth. We de…ne a peak as the month immediately preceding a recession and the trough as the month immediately before six of eight consecutive months of positive employment growth. The length of the recession, then, is the number of months between the peak and trough. We then de…ne a recovery period as the number of months required to reach the pre-recession level of employment. Table 1 about here. Table 1 shows characteristics of business cycles for the states and the nation. We use the NBER-dated recession data to identify national recessions. The second column shows the number of recessions experienced over the sample period for each state. The third column shows the average number of months in that state's recessions. The fourth and …fth columns show the mean and standard deviation of the recovery times following each recession. The sixth column shows the average depth of each state's recessions described by the average employment loss over recession months, as a percentage of the size of the labor force. 4 Of the states examined, New York and Rhode Island experienced the largest number of recessions (15) in the sample period between 1939 3 Another approach would be to use the statistical methods utilized in Owyang, Piger, and Wall (2005). Hamilton (2011), however, shows that, for the nation, a simple heuristic rule for de…ning recessions approximates more rigorous statistical techniques. 4 To be consistent with how we measure other state-speci…c variables that we assume not to change over time, we take the average of the size of the labor force over the years 1990-2006. and 2012. During the same period, the nation experienced twelve recessions. North Dakota is the fastest-recovering state, with an average recovery time of 4.8 months -almost half that of Alabama (8.6 months), the next-fastest-recovering state.
We see signi…cant heterogeneity between the recession and recovery experiences of states that is not evident in a comparison of national recessions. It is well documented that the recoveries from the last three recessions are much longer (33 months, on average) than the previous nine (eight months, on average), while the lengths of the recessions remain relatively unchanged. States, on the other hand, su¤er from longer recessions but also tend to endure longer recoveries in order to stabilize economic activity after the trough. For example, the average recession length in Connecticut is 24.1 months and the average recovery length is 25.1 months. The average length of a recession in Massachusetts is 21.5 months while the average recovery takes 21.4 months. Likewise, states that have shorter, milder recessions tend to also recover more quickly. For example, the average recession in North Dakota lasts about 11.9 months and the average recovery takes about 4.8 months.
In addition, states in the Far West, Plains, and Rocky Mountain regions tend to experience fewer, shorter recessions and are able to recover more quickly, possibly indicating shallower recessions in this region on average.
Column 6 of Table 1 illustrates that of the states in the sample, Nevada, Rhode Island, and Wyoming experience the deepest contractions, with average employment losses of 0.15%, 0.16%, and 0.25% of the labor force per month in recession (respectively). Michigan (0.14%), Indiana (0.14%), and Florida (0.13%) also su¤er considerable monthly employment losses during recessions. North Dakota endures the most moderate contractions, losing only 0.05% of its labor force, on average, during each month in recession. Texas, Vermont, and Virginia also experience fairly moderate contractions, all losing only 0.07% of the labor force monthly. (2012) and the size of the net oil price increase as constructed in Hamilton (1996) . 5 The oil production index (Oil PI) projects the pervasiveness of oil production in the overall state output. Hamilton (1996) explains that in order to construct a clear picture of the severity of an oil shock, one must compare the current price to where it had been over the previous year. The analysis de…nes the net oil price increase by comparing the price of oil at time t with the maximum value observed during the previous year. If the value at time t exceeds the previous year's maximum, the percentage change from that maximum is computed and represents the net oil price increase at time t. In addition, we measure the conditions in …nancial markets by including the monthly growth in the S&P 500 at the beginning of the recession.
Controlling for State and Recession-speci…c Heterogeneity
At the end of each recession, we use the most recent census total population for each state to measure select state covariates in per capita terms. We also control for the fraction of each state's population with a college degree. 6 The college fraction is used to test whether more-educated individuals have di¤erent labor market experiences, in terms of job retention and successes in job search. For example, it is plausible that more-educated workers have greater job security so fewer are displaced during recessions. Also, when they are unemployed, they mmay have higher job…nding rates. 7 We also include the share of the labor force between 16 and 24 years of age, who 5 The oil share index is calculated as 100 times the number of barrels of crude oil produced in the state in 1984 divided by the state's personal income level in that year. The oil data are from the Energy Information Administration and the income data are from the Census Bureau. 6 The fraction of the population with a college degree is available annually and is obtained from the U.S. Statistical Abstracts. We compute the deviation of each state's share from the national mean. Due to data limitation, we use the 1954 value of each state for recessions prior to 1954. For recessions in 1954 and later, we use the state values in the year each recession ended. 7 Kettunen (1997) studies the relationship between the level of education and the probability of re-employment. Using a Weibull model of unemployment duration with Finnish microeconomic data on unemployed workers, the may represent a more transient portion of the workforce. These data are obtained from the BLS.
We control for other features of the labor market with potential impacts on the length of unemployment spells. For example, we control for …rm sizes across states measured as the average share over 1990 -2006 of total employment for …rms having less than 100 employees. Larger …rms may have greater access to credit and alternative sources of working capital and therefore be more able to hire workers (or layo¤ fewer workers) during economic downturns. Industry mix is obtained from the BLS and we focus on the average of the annual NAICS industry shares of total payroll employment in manufacturing, construction, and …nancial activities (…nance, insurance, and real estate) from 1990-2006. We also include union memberships, which may a¤ect the persistence of unemployment [Barro (1988) ]. Union membership is represented by the percent of the state's total employment represented by unions in 2010 and is also obtained from the BLS. 8 Finally, we control for home-ownership which may re ‡ect potential migration costs that cause households to endure long spells of unemployment rather than move to states with better labor market conditions. We use the percentage of owner-occupied houses in 2000 in each state (obtained from U.S. Census data). In addition to this, we control for changes in the e¤ective mortgage interest rate between the peak and the trough in each state's recession experiences over the 1978 -2010 period. The mortgage rate is obtained from the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) and we elect to look only at state recessions after 1978 due to data limitations.
Policy Variables
While national-level policies are common across states at the time they are implemented, di¤erences in the timing of recessions and recoveries may alter their e¤ects. We can also exploit the fact that some states do not enter recessions when the nation does and some states enter recessions independent of the nation. As such, we examine the e¤ect of two national-level countercyclical paper …nds that unemployed persons with 13 -14 years of education have the highest re-employment probability. Using years of schooling as an explanatory variable, Ashenfelter and Ham (1979) found that education had no e¤ect on unemployment duration. However, Nickell (1979) and Kiefer (1985) found a negative relationship between education and unemployment duration. 8 Partridge and Rickman (1997) investigate similar factors and …nd that having a larger percentage of college graduates and fast-growing industries (relative to the national average) reduces the state unemployment rate. Furthermore, having a greater fraction of union workers, more generous unemployment bene…ts and a higher percentage of homeownership generates positive (relative) e¤ects on the state-level unemployment rate. When state-level …xed e¤ects are included in the regressions, the positive e¤ects from unions and unemployment bene…ts reverse signs and are insigni…cant. and state-level policy can alter the duration of unemployment spells. Meyer (1990) , for example, …nds that higher unemployment insurance bene…ts have a strong negative e¤ect on the probability of an individual leaving unemployment. The probability of leaving unemployment also increases sharply once the bene…ts lapse.
Fourth, we include data on the level of the minimum wage in each state. Some states do not set any price ‡oor on wages and thus allow for more competitive market clearing in labor markets.
In those states that place a restriction on the lower bound for wages, employers may be more reluctant to rehire should the minimum wage exceed what they are willing and able to pay in times of recession. This may prolong recoveries in overall employment levels. Minimum wage data are obtained from the Department of Labor and are available beginning in 1968. We construct this variable as the real, in ‡ation-adjusted di¤erence between the state-level minimum wage and the level mandated by the federal government.
Finally, we include measures of state-level countercyclical budget policy. Safeguarding against negative events is the purpose of states'"rainy day"funds as captured by the Budget Stabilization Fund. Wagner and Sobel (2006) construct a dataset highlighting the year in which each state adopted Budget Stabilization Funds. Since the rules governing stabilization funds di¤er across states in terms of severity of constraints, we …rst include a dummy variable indicating whether or not the state had a fund in place during each recession. The authors also document when deposit and withdrawal rules were placed upon the fund and whether the fund was adopted statutorily (imposed by the legislature) or constitutionally (an amendment imposed upon the legislature through voter referendum or citizen initiative). To capture the extent to which these funds dictate what state governments can and cannot do in times of contractionary economic conditions, we use the characteristics of withdrawal rules, which fall into four categories, 1 through 4, with a 1 denoting the weakest constraints and 4 denoting the strictest constraints. We choose to focus on the withdrawal rules because these will impact how and when states can withdraw from the funds to use as stimulus during recessions.
Modeling the Duration of a Recovery
Most models of the business cycle are time series models with nonlinearities that capture shifts in the cycle phases (e.g., Markov switching), possibly driven by other exogenous variables. In this paper, we approach the problem from an alternative point of view, modeling each state-recessionrecovery experience as a single observation. We can then determine which policies, if any, a¤ect the average time it takes a state to recover from a recession after controlling for economic conditions and inherent state-level characteristics.
We adopt a time-to-event model and de…ne the event in question as fully completing the re-covery (i.e., returning to the pre-recession level of employment). We employ an accelerated failure time model [Sha, Tadesse, and Vannucci (2006) ], which suggests a direct physical interpretation of the relationship between the failure time and the covariates. 11 Like Sha, Tadesse, and Vannucci (2006) , we adopt the data augmentation approach of Tanner and Wong (1987) to impute the censored survival times should a state fail to recover completely before entering another recession. These state-recession experiences are considered to be right-censored at the beginning of the subsequent recession. Then, we apply a Bayesian variable selection approach to determine which covariates are most important for explaining recovery times in each individual state and incorporate the augmented survival times into the variable selection process by using mixture priors for the regression coe¢ cients.
We observe the business cycle characteristics of N states. De…ne T nt as the length of time in months required for employment in state n to return to its pre-recession level subsequent to a trough occurring at time t. We assume T nt is a log-normal random variable and treat each state-time recession as independent observations. Consequently, we index each observed recovery duration by both n and t. 12 States may have di¤erent numbers of recessions at di¤erent periods of time, making our panel unbalanced and irregular. We specify conjugate priors for the model parameters, which allows us to integrate out the regression coe¢ cients when deriving the marginalized likelihood and speed up the model-…tting procedure considerably.
Suppose log (T nt ) is related to a (Z 1) vector of observable covariates, x nt , via a linear model:
where 0 is the intercept term, x is a (Z 1) vector of coe¢ cients, s n is a state-…xed e¤ect for recessions that occur in state n, and " nt is an iid error variable that follows a normal distribution.
Including the s n term allows for controlling for unobserved state-level heterogeneity, which may 1 1 The widely used Cox Proportional Hazards model assumes a multiplicative e¤ect of the regression variables on the probability of an event, but there is no direct relationship between the covariates and the actual time to the event itself. Furthermore, this type of time-to-event study faces complications when dealing with a large number of possible covariates due to the high dimensionality of the data, which may be correlated. 1 2 Although the recoveries will be indexed by t, we do not formally treat the data as a time series. That is, we do not explicitly model the evolution of the recoveries over time except through the set of possibly time-dependent covariates. Thus, we could index the recessions by a count variable (say, k = 1; :::; K) but prefer the time index for later exposition of the results. a¤ect the pace of recovery. Exponentiating (1) results in
where w nt = exp (" nt ). Thus, the failure times have a baseline hazard function 0 (w nt ) that is independent of the linear predictor term ( 0 + x nt 0 x + s n s ). Let nt ( ) represent the value of the hazard function periods following state n's trough at time t:
The hazard function denotes the probability that the recovery ends after the T nt month, conditional on it lasting at least that long, and depends on a (Z 1) vector of observable covariates, A complication in modeling the duration of recoveries is that there may be occasions when the employment level does not return to the pre-recession high before another recession occurs. In this case, we can treat that duration data point as censored. Let C nt be the time between state n's trough occurring at time t and its next recession occurring at time t + C nt . We can de…ne an indicator nt such that nt = 1 if the end of the spell is observed (i.e., if T nt C nt ) and nt = 0 if the observation is right-censored. Thus, K nt = min fT nt ; C nt g re ‡ects the observed recovery duration associated with state n's period t trough. 13 We adopt the data augmentation method of Tanner and Wong (1987) to impute these censored values. Let Y be the vector of augmented 1 3 The censored observations do have some information, since we know that the recovery lasted at least to Cnt.
time-to-recovery data with elements Y nt = log (T nt ) such that 8 > < > :
Covariate Selection
Because we wish to test many (possibly competing) hypotheses and control for a large number of possible state-and time-speci…c characteristics, the number of covariates can be large. 
where m is invariant to the state n and the recession occurrence t.
In practice, estimation of the model indicator will yield the posterior probability that X i nt is included in the model. The …rst element of m corresponds to the intercept term and is always set equal to 1 so it is included in every proposed model. One advantage of using the model indicators is that the mode model (i.e., the model for which the mode of the posterior distribution of m is computed) has a dimension (often substantially) less than M . In addition, because the actual recovery time T nt is a nonlinear function of the explanatory data, including an irrelevant covariate can a¤ect the marginal e¤ect of other covariates even if the coe¢ cient on the irrelevant covariate is very small.
The explanatory covariates are separated into state-level, national-level, and state-recession speci…c categories. This allows us to judge if the main drivers of recoveries come from (i) a common push at the national-level a¤ecting all states, (ii) individual state characteristics that allow some states to bounce back more quickly, or (iii) characteristics speci…c to each separate state-recession experience. A larger posterior probability of inclusion in the model suggests that the particular covariate makes a signi…cant contribution in supporting a state's recovery.
Estimation
The model is estimated using Bayesian methods. The Bayesian framework implements covariate 
Priors and Likelihood
Assuming a normal distribution for " nt , " nt iid N 0; 2 implies the log-normal distribution for T nt .
The augmented data are normally distributed, Y j X; ; 2 N X ; 2 I . In order to simplify the MCMC sampler, we assume conjugate priors so that we can integrate out and 2 and avoid updating the M -vector of coe¢ cients at every iteration. Conjugate priors for this model take the following forms:
Sha, Tadesse, and Vannucci (2006) explain that after integrating out and 2 , the marginal likelihood of the augmented data can be expressed as
This likelihood is associated with a multivariate t-distribution for the augmented data:
where the full conditional distribution of the censored observations is a truncated t-distribution to which standard Gibbs sampling updates can be applied.
To impose little prior structure, vague priors are assigned by setting b 0 = 0 M 1 , and B 0 = diag (h) with h an M 1 vector of large values. Finally, we assign a small value for v 0 to impose a weakly informative prior on 2 .
The hyperparameters for the prior distributions are given in Table 3 . Table 3 about here.
Variable Selection
The draw of the model inclusion indicators is a form of Gibbs variable selection, which is executed using a reversible jump MCMC variable selection algorithm based upon that of Green (1995) . The reversible jump step is necessary because the dimension of the model may change size across iterations of the sampler. The MCMC algorithm begins with an initial model composed of a randomly selected subset of the covariates and migrates toward models with higher posterior probability.
Following the approach of Sha, Tadesse, and Vannucci (2006), we assume that when the model indicator suggests a variable be included in the model, the regression coe¢ cients are normal; otherwise they are set to zero:
where b 0i is the i-th element of the b 0 vector, B 0i is the i-th diagonal element of the B 0 matrix from (5), and (0) is a point mass density at zero. The index i excludes the …rst element, as this references the intercept term and is included in every proposed model. We assume a Bernoulli(p)
prior distribution for each element of the model indicators:
We select p to di¤erentiate how likely each of the covariates is to be included or excluded from the model: Setting p = 0:5 makes it equally likely for each covariate to be either included or excluded, making the prior on inclusion ‡at-all models are equally likely. A more restrictive prior would set p 0, accepting only those covariates that have very strong explanatory power for the length of recoveries.
Generating m conditional on Y;
m The MCMC iterations alternate between updating the model indicators and updating the draws for censored recovery times. To propose a new model in the …rst step, we use a Metropolis algorithm to add a covariate, delete a covariate, or swap between one included and one excluded covariate.
We randomly select from three potential moves:
1. Randomly choose a variable index and change it from 0 to 1 or 1 to 0:
(a) If only one covariate is currently included, the probability of the proposed model is
M , to re ‡ect the random selection among the M 1 potential unused covariates.
(b) Otherwise, the probability of the proposed model is 1.
2. Randomly exchange 0 for 1 by choosing one variable currently included and one variable currently excluded -set the probability of the proposed model again to 1. Model selection provides a more comprehensive look at the ability of the overall model, controlling for a variety of factors, to describe recoveries.
In the second MCMC step, we update the censored elements of Y where nt = 0 by drawing from the t-distribution of (8).
Selection of Relevant Variables
The marginal posterior probability that variable i be included in the model is estimated by the empirical frequency of m i = 1 within the MCMC output. We will focus on those variables identi…ed as having marginal posterior probability greater than some threshold : These results allude to inference about variable selection based upon the most likely model:
for k = 1; :::; K MCMC iterations.
Prediction of Recovery Times
Given a set of covariate data x nt , we can predict the recovery time for a given state-recession experience by utilizing a model-averaging technique similar to those presented in Madigan and 
Results
We estimate the recovery duration model of Section 3 with the Bayesian method outlined above.
We include a number of variables intended to control for state-level heterogeneity, recession-speci…c economic conditions, and state and federal government policies. Among the data discussed in Section 2, we also include interaction terms between (1) state oil share index and the Hamilton net oil price increase, (2) the real minimum wage di¤erential and the percentage of the labor force between the ages of 16 and 24, (3) the share of the workforce employed in the …nance industry and the change in the S&P 500, and (4) the percentage of owner-occupied housing and the change in mortgage rates. Table 4 shows the estimated coe¢ cients on all of the covariates. Column 2 gives the marginal probabilities of inclusion. Column 3 shows the model-probability-weighted mean of the coe¢ cient estimates computed as in Section 4.3 for the proposed model in each MCMC iteration k. The draws are weighted according to the normalized posterior probability of potential model m (k) . Column 4
gives the arithmetic mean of the coe¢ cient draws for those models including variable x nt . Columns 5 and 6 give the 95% posterior coverage interval based upon all post-burn in MCMC draws. A positive implies that the expected log recovery time increases as x nt increases. Therefore, positive coe¢ cients have a multiplicative e¤ect on amplifying recovery times while negative coe¢ cients reduce expected recovery times.
Those covariates with high probability of inclusion (close to 1:00) are (1) the length of the recession, (2) other states in the same BEA region also in recession, (3) the max oil shock, and (4) state …scal spending. An increase in any of these increases the log recovery time and, thus, extends the expected recovery times (multiplicatively). The change in the federal funds rate over the recessionary period and the interaction between the max oil shock and the oil share index both have around 0:50 probability of inclusion (0:55 and 0:49 each, respectively), suggesting that these factors strongly a¤ect recovery times. Both model-implied coe¢ cients are positive, indicating that a reduction in the level of the federal funds rate decreases expected recovery times.
None of the labor market characteristics appear to have important e¤ects on the speed of recovery. All of these variables have very low probabilities of inclusion and their coe¢ cients do not suggest signi…cant e¤ects on log recovery times.
Recession-Speci…c E¤ects
We …nd that the length of the preceding recession positively a¤ects the length of recovery times.
All else equal, the longer a state is in recession the more extended will be the subsequent recovery.
There appears to be some sort of memory and persistence in economic conditions at play. Longer recessions cause deep, persistent contractions in economic activity and therefore require a longer transition to recovery.
Aggregate economic conditions at the regional level appear to adversely a¤ect the recovery times in most states. For example, more states in recession in the same BEA region makes the recovery slower for each state. This level of aggregation appears to be more appropriate than including only states that border a state in recession or including all of the contiguous U.S. states in our sample. The sampler omits these covariates and suggests a very low probability of inclusion, whereas recessions within the same BEA region seem to be the most informative. This suggests that the BEA-de…ned economic areas share similar business cycle experiences. The literature on state-level economic activity and policy spillovers suggests that comovements of regional business cycles should in ‡uence the ability to switch between recessionary and expansionary phases.
The positive coe¢ cient on the net oil price shock suggests that an increase in oil prices prior to or at the beginning of the recession causes states take to recover more slowly. Higher oil prices constrain aggregate production and limit expansion of economic activity. Also, the interaction between the oil share index and the net oil shock slows recovery times. Those states heavily invested in oil production seem to be hit the hardest when recessions follow sizeable oil shocks.
The E¤ect of Policy on Recovery Times
In this section, we consider two types of policies generally thought to stabilize the economy in times of recession: expansionary monetary policy and expansionary …scal policy. We do not discuss state unemployment bene…ts or the budget stabilization funds in detail, as the sampler excludes these variables and there is no signi…cant evidence that these policies in ‡uence recovery times.
Focusing speci…cally on federal government activity, …scal policy does not seem to have a signi…cant e¤ect on reducing expected recovery times and is consistently excluded from the model. conditions. We would like to model that policy stimulates economies out of recession and helps in the recovery process. However, policymakers may act more aggressively during long, strenuous recoveries and it would appear that signi…cant stimulus coincides with long recovery times. Therefore policy may be reacting to the recession and recovery experience, rather than the recovery responding to policy action. Bernoulli (p) p = 0:5 Table 3 : Prior speci…cations for all model parameters. 
State Heterogeneity E¤ects

